

civilian government in Petrograd under Kerensky, and the military, in Mogilev.

Savinkov was supposed to represent Petrograd in dealing with Kornilov, but actually he represented the General in dealing with Kerensky. Relations between the two men became more and more hostile. They no longer fought for the program—Kerensky had none—but for power. All the odds would have been on the side of the Petrograd government if it had wished to use the support of the Executive Committee and, therefore, the support of the army. But it did not want to owe anything to the Soviets and tried instead to appease and outmaneuver the enraged General. This policy had a disastrous effect on the nation and particularly on the army. As on the eve of the fall of Tsarism, confusion and anarchy were spreading throughout the country, not from the depths of dark emotions of the people but from the top.

The Supreme Commander was beginning to lose control over his nerves and sent out orders that occasionally were so stupid that the army commanders could not even reveal them to their subordinates. General Parsky showed me one such order and asked, "What should I do? Shall I explain the situation to the Supreme Commander? If I do, my answer and his telegram will become known to at least half a dozen persons. I would hate to embarrass the Supreme Commander."

The telegram of the Supreme Commander had been provoked by a minor incident in the Twelfth Army—an outburst of panic in a regiment during the night. The incident had been settled by regimental representatives, and order was restored so promptly that local command had had no time to inform the Iskosol or me of the event. Some twelve hours later came Kornilov's telegram instructing Parsky to destroy the "fleeing" regiment immediately by artillery fire. There was no "fleeing" regiment by this time and all was quiet on the front, but this was an operational order to be executed at once. I said to Parsky, "Publication of this telegram would be a terrible blow to the authority of the officers. File it and forget about it." He followed my advice and did not even answer Mogilev.

Yet General Kornilov remained under the impression that his order had saved the situation in the Twelfth Army. A week later, addressing the National Conference in Moscow, he described this incident as evidence of the salutary effect of severe measures: "A few days ago, during the German offensive against Riga, the 56th Siberian Regiment, which had covered itself with glory in battles, left its positions, threw away its arms, and fled. Only the pressure of force of arms, after I had telegraphed an order to annihilate the fleeing regiment, made it return to its position."